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INTRODUCTION

From its inception, this nation has been governed by a guiding principle of equality. The Declaration of Independence professes,
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... I

In order to secure equality and these inalienable rights, the people of
the United States have established a constitution,2 amendments
thereto,3 and supporting legislation.4 Congress sought to insure dis1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (forbidding the federal government from
granting anyone title of nobility); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (extending the privileges and immunities of citizens in each state to the citizens among all the states).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (granting due process and equal protection
rights to all citizens against State governments); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1
(prohibiting voting discrimination based upon gender).
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abled individuals equality in the workplace through the enactment of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"),5 specifically,
section 504 ("section 504")6 and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 7 Congress intended that these Acts create oppor-

tunities for the disabled and reduce the discrimination, whether
expressed or not,8 faced by an isolated group of individuals in the population. 9 This Comment questions some courts' interpretation and ap-

plication of these statutes. In particular, it questions the lack of
harmony among courts in defining and measuring disabilitiesand limitations under the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.10

Courts have applied two separate standards in determining the
proper time to measure disabilities. Some courts, guided by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC")1' decisions, regulations, and interpretive guidelines, provide for a pre-mitigation mea-

surement of disability. 2 Other courts reject the EEOC guidelines and

4. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1994) (proscribing
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-796 (1994). Other sections are not discussed in detail. While
proscribing discrimination, other sections target different entities.
Sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibit the federal government and most federal contractors from discriminating in employment and
requires them to use affirmative action to employ persons with disabilities.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act goes beyond employment and prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in programs and activities
of the federal government and by recipients of federal financial assistance.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 446.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994).
8. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-97 (1985).
9. This Comment does not solely concern the dilemma facing any particular disability. It is intended to address all disabilities. However, certain disability claims,
such as diabetes claims, are often litigated and simply a vehicle to prove the author's
point. Additionally, the cases discussed in this Comment are not unique in their holdings or in their decisions to measure disabilities post-mitigation. See, e.g., Murphy v.
UPS, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1996); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F.
Supp. 1437 (W.D. Wis. 1996). They are simply representative of the rationale and
problems created by a significant number of courts.
10. In this paper, the discrimination in the cited cases is to be taken as true. This
approach is similar to a damages issue under a Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) analysis. In a Hadley analysis, consequential damages are not
awarded unless the damages are foreseeable. The question is not whether the breach
is foreseeable but, rather, given the breach, are these damages foreseeable. Without
such a stipulation, the analysis is often misguided. The only issue in question is
whether the individual is disabled as defined under the ADA. The author has discovered that without this stipulation, readers tend to digress into the philosophical wisdom of affording protection and possible abuses by employees. While valid, these
discussions distract from the issue.
11. The EEOC is the agency charged with implementing and enforcing this title of
the act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994).
12. A pre-mitigation impairment means an impairment that exists "without regard
to mitigating measures such as medicines or assistive or prosthetic devices." 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(h) (1996).
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apply a post-mitigation measurement. 1 3 An individual seeking statutory protection faces a difficult, if not impossible, burden proving a
disability under the post-mitigation standard. In contrast, the postmitigation standard favors the employer, because fewer individuals
will ultimately carry this burden. The question therefore becomes,
should discrimination claims be evaluated in a light more favorable to
the individual or the employer? The answer may lie somewhere in the
middle.
While the statutes at issue offer protection to the disabled, they are
not inherently anti-employer statutes. Rather, they are designed to
afford disabled individuals the very privileges most Americans receive
on a daily basis. But determination of the appropriate standard can
affect the outcome. Whichever standard is chosen, the plaintiff still
bears the burden of proving a disability, proving discrimination, and
proving that he is otherwise qualified for the position. Additionally,
while the plaintiff carries these burdens, the employer is secure in the
knowledge that only reasonable accommodations are necessary. This,
while seeming harsh, is the appropriate approach, and is grounded in
the Act's legislative history and the EEOC's interpretive guidelines.
On the other hand, courts which measure a plaintiff's condition only
after a mitigation or correction, unnecessarily favor the employer and
severely limit an individual's ability to seek redress under the Acts.
These courts claim to find support for post-mitigation measurement in
the "plain language" of the statutes. Based on an inflexible reading of
the statute, these courts are denying the existence of a disability and
thereby consigning some disabled individuals to a life of continuing
discrimination. These judicial decisions manifest reasoning that
threaten the scope and policies at the very foundation of the legislation and unnecessarily burden individuals claiming legal redress under
the Acts.
This Comment begins with an historical background of the ADA
and Rehabilitation Act, looking at specific language in the statutes
and how the courts' and the EEOC's application of that language is
inconsistent. Next, this Comment explores the dilemma that employers face when post-mitigation measures are taken against them by the
courts. Finally, this Comment concludes that courts must widen the
mitigation opportunities of disabled Americans.

13. A post-mitigation measurement looks to see whether an impairment still exists
after the use of medication or other medical treatment. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F.
Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

RehabilitationAct

As early as the 1920s, legislation was enacted recognizing the plight
of the disabled.1 4 Nearly fifty years later, a second wave of recognition, expanding the rights of the handicapped, was established in court
decisions mandating that disabled children receive public education.15
These decisions are nearly contemporaneous with the debate and passage of the Rehabilitation Act.1 6 This Act was Congress's response to
the discrimination still experienced by the handicapped which the
Civil Rights Act of 196417 failed to address. Although "[t]he Rehabilitation Act is silent as to the constitutional authority under which it
was enacted," 18 the consensus appears to be that it was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause' 9 and targeted government agencies and
private entities that received federal assistance. 20 Section 504, as writ14. The Fess-Kenyon Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 735, was the first major legislation to
challenge the then prevalent notion that a disability equated to an inevitable lifelong
economic dependency. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 25 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 448. The impetus of this act was the return of large numbers
of injured and disabled World War I veterans. This influx, combined with the nation's
industrialization and the corresponding rise in industrial accidents, prompted this
early legislation. See id.
15. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that
the exclusion of disabled children from receiving public education is unlawful); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (stating that mentally retarded children have an equal right to receive public
education).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b) (1994).
In addition to the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, Congress enacted several other
pieces of legislation designed to promote equal opportunity and integration
of disabled people into the mainstream of American life. Chronologically,
these statutes included: 1968, Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4151 et
seq. (required federally funded or leased buildings to be accessible); 1970,
Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (required eligible jurisdictions to provide accessibility plan for mass transportation); 1973, Education
for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (provided that
each handicapped child was entitled to a free appropriate education in the
least restrictive environment); and 1975, National Housing Act Amendments, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (provided for barrier removal in federally
supported housing).
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 25 n.10 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
448.
17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribed discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin and sex. See id.
18. Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 1996), affid, 124 F.3d
1019 (9th Cir. 1997).
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1 (giving Congress the power to lay and collect
taxes and charging Congress with the duty of paying debts and providing for the common defense and the general welfare of the country).
20. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Act under both the Spending
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 246 (1985) (upholding states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from a pri-
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ten, regulated all private entities receiving federal assistance. 2 1 These
entities were deemed to have accepted the duties and responsibilities
of the Act as quid pro quo for receiving federal moneys.2 2
According to the Supreme Court, Congress's purpose in passing
and amending the Rehabilitation Act was "an effort 'to share with
handicapped Americans the opportunities for an education, transportation, housing, health care, and jobs that other Americans take for
granted.'", 3 The Rehabilitation Act mandates:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United
States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 4
In 1974, Congress amended the definition of a handicappedindividual
to include, "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment., 25 According to the Court, Congress's
intent in amending the definition was not only to attack simple prejudice, but also to reform "archaic attitudes and laws."2, 6 Additionally,
the Court found "the American people are simply unfamiliar with and
insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps.",2 7 The Court expounded further on Congressional reasons for
the modification, stating:
To combat the effects of erroneous but nevertheless prevalent perceptions of the handicapped, Congress expanded the definition of
"handicapped individual" so as to preclude discrimination against
"[a] person who has a record of, or is regarded as having, an impair28
ment [but who] may at present have no actual incapacity at all."
vate cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act) (superseded in 1986 by the Civil
Rights Remedies Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994), which provides that
"[a] State shall not be immune under the Constitution of the United States from suit
in Federal Court for a violation of ...the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.").

21. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
22. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597,
605 (1986) (citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1984)).
23. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987) (quoting 123
CONG. REC. 13515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
25. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1982) (amended by 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994)).
26. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6373, 6400).
27. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6373, 6400) (alteration in original).

28. Id. (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-06 n.6
(1979) (alteration in original)).
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Under this expanded definition, an individual having no current incapacity may find protection under the statute.2 9 Simply stated, Congress's intent in amending the definition of "disabled" was to ensure
greater protection for those individuals facing discriminatory employment policies and barriers predicated on actual or perceived
disability.3 °
While seemingly broad in scope, neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act is as consummate in its proscription as other anti-discriminatory legislation or amendments,31 because their impact is tempered
with language that requires an individual be otherwise qualified.32
Recognition of a disability, coupled with blatant discrimination, is not
commensurate to statutory protection. The term, otherwise qualified,
has been construed by the Supreme Court to require a person to be
"able to meet all of a program's essential requirements in spite of his
handicap."33 Thus, an individual must be disabled and possess the
necessary credentials, job skills, and ability to perform the tasks required by a position before he is entitled statutory relief.34 An individual's disability, therefore, is not by itself determinative of
eligibility; rather, it is the intersection between the individual's disability and the requirements of the position.3
B.

Case Law Interpretingthe RehabilitationAct

In a trilogy of cases, Southeastern Community College v. Davis,3 6
Alexander v. Choate,3 7 and School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,38 the Supreme Court established the concept of essential functions and reasonable accommodations. Additionally, the Court

broadened the definition of handicap, while narrowing the meaning of
29. See id.
30. See id. at 278-79 & n.3.
31. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (1994).
33. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
34. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m) (1996). This examination is to determine
whether an individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position. See id. "[To]
determin[e] whether an accountant who is paraplegic is qualified for a certified public
accountant (CPA) position is to examine the individual's credentials to determine
whether the individual is a licensed CPA." Id. Additionally, an individual's disability
can be so limiting as to prevent the individual from meeting the otherwise qualified
requirement. In other words, an individual might be too disabled to be afforded stat-

utory protection.
35. This is quite different than the Civil Rights Act. Under that Act, a court
would never inquire if a woman's gender made her too female for statutory
protection.
36. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
37. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).

38. 480 U.S. 273 (1986).
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otherwise qualified.39 Essential functions are the minimum job re-

quirements that an individual must be capable of performing before
statutory protection may be invoked."n The essential functions concept was the Court's interpretation and expansion of the statute's
otherwise qualified requirement.4 1 This concept was designed to en-

sure that handicapped individuals will not be excluded from legal protection when they are fully capable of performing all of the essential

functions of a position, yet are unable to perform some marginal
functions.4 2
The second concept, reasonable accommodation, is the standard

employers must tolerate in facilitating a disabled individual's intro-

duction into the workplace. 43 This requirement provides greater op-

portunity to the handicapped by demanding flexibility of the
employer.
Finally, by expanding the term handicap to include the impact of an
impairment on others, the Court broadened the scope of the statute.
Again, an apparent victory for the handicapped is diffused because

this expansion also includes evaluation of the impact on others in the
otherwise qualified evaluation.
1. Southeastern Community College v. Davis

The first case to interpret the Rehabilitation Act was Southeastern
Community College v. Davis.4 4 In Southeastern, the plaintiff sought

training as a registered nurse; however, the nursing program4 5 refused
to admit her because of a severe hearing disability.4 6 The plaintiff instituted suit and alleged that the school refused to admit her because
of her disability. She contended that the Department of Health, Edu-

cation, and Welfare ("HEW") regulations required the school to make
all necessary accommodations4 7 or to
requirements.48

modify the curriculum

39. See W. Robert Gray, The Essential-FunctionsLimitation on the Civil Rights of
People with Disabilities and John Rawls's Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L. REV.
295, 300 (1992).
40. See id. at 299-302.
41. See Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 406-07.
42. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m) (1996).
43. See Alexander, 480 U.S. at 301.
44. 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (finding a nursing student unqualified to meet the necessary standards required by a nursing program).
45. This was a state institution that received federal assistance and was, therefore,
subject to the Act. See id. at 400.
46. See id. at 401.
47. See id. at 404. Generally, an employer is required to make reasonable accommodations allowing a disabled individual to perform all necessary job functions. See
id. However, the Court articulated that if the accommodation created an "undue financial or administrative burden" it was not reasonable. Id. at 406. Accommodation
is a critical concept in disability jurisprudence; however, it is beyond the scope of this
Comment. Any discussion will be specifically limited to the facts discussed.
48. See id. at 407-09.
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The Court began its opinion with an analysis of the Rehabilitation
Act and found section 504 only requires that "otherwise qualified"
individuals not be excluded because of their handicaps.49 It adopted
the definition that an otherwise qualified individual is "[an individual]
who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of [a]
handicap."5 ° The Court concluded that section 504 does not require
substantial modifications to programs, nor does it require employers
to totally ignore the actual limitations associated with the disability.51
Thus, any such requirement by HEW would be contrary to the stat-

ute's language, history, and purpose and would require judicial scrutiny of the regulation's validity.52
Relying on the same HEW regulations, the Court determined that
educational programs may require an applicant to possess certain necessary or essential physical qualifications to participate in a program.53
Simply stated, a federally funded program may establish essential job
related criteria.54 If an individual fails to meet these criteria, then discrimination does not exist.55 However, the Court emphasized that
these criteria must be essential or necessary to the job, not simply
marginally related to the position.5 6 This is the essential functions
concept.
To determine whether Southeastern Community College discriminated, the Court then ascertained the necessity of the requirements
set by the nursing program and adjudicated the requirements valid.5 7
Again, the Court rejected any interpretation of the Act requiring affirmative action or a fundamental alteration of the program. 58 However, the Court added:
49. See id. at 405.
50. Id. at 406 (appearing to ignore accommodation and requiring individuals to
meet essential requirements without any adjustment). See also Gray, supra note 39,
at 300-01.
51. See Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 408-12.
52. See id. at 411-12.
53. See id. at 406-07, 414.
54. See id. at 406-07.
55. See id. at 409-10. This is a finding that the individual is not otherwise qualified
for the position.
56. See id. at 407.
57. See id. at 407-09.
58. See id. at 404. The Court received much criticism for the term "affirmative
action" in this context. The Court subsequently noted the difference between "affirmative action and reasonable accommodation; the former is said to refer to a remedial
policy for the victims of past discrimination, while the latter relates to the elimination
of existing obstacles against the handicapped." Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
300 n.20 (1985). The Alexander Court, in further explaining "affirmative action," directed readers to the following: Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir.
1982) ("Use of the phrase 'affirmative action' in this context is unfortunate, making it
difficult to talk about any kind of affirmative efforts without importing the special
legal and social connotations of that term."); Note, Accommodating the Handicapped:
The Meaning of DiscriminationUnder Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U.
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We do not suggest that the line between lawful refusal to extend
affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped
persons always will be clear. It is possible to envision situations
where an insistence on continuing past requirements and practices
might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons
of the opportunity to participate in a covered program. Technological advances can be expected ... to qualify them [the handicapped]

for some useful employment. 59
Although the nursing program had set forth reasonable, essential requirements, the Court did not foreclose the possibility of discrimination when programs refuse to make accommodations.6" The Court
emphasized that its interpretation recognized a preference, demonstrated by Congress, to effectuate evenhanded treatment of qualified,
handicapped individuals,
rather than to mandate the surmounting of
61
all disabilities.
2.

Alexander v. Choate

The next case before the Supreme Court was Alexander v. Choate.6 z
The State of Tennessee reduced the number of annual inpatient hospital days covered by the state's Medicaid program,6 3 and the plaintiffs
filed a class action suit asserting disproportionate impact on the disabled in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.6 4
In Alexander, the Court began by recognizing that the need to "give
effect to the statutory objectives" and the need to keep the Act "manageable" were competing considerations that required balancing.65
The Alexander Court ruled that the reduction in coverage did not distinguish the handicapped from the non-handicapped and also did not
deny plaintiffs meaningful access to the state's Medicaid services.6 6
Additionally, and more importantly, the Alexander decision clarified Southeastern'sstatements, when the Court ruled that Southeastern
did not eliminate the requirement of accommodation, only those instances of accommodation that required a fundamental change.67 The
Court stated, "It is clear from the context of [Southeastern] that the
L. REV. 881, 885-86 (1980); Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating
Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 185-86 (1980).

59. Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 412.
60. See id. at 412-13. While announcing this policy, the Court provided no guidance or standard to be used. See id.
61. See id. at 410.

62. 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (dealing with disparate impact on handicapped due to
changes in state Medicaid program).
63. See id. at 289.

64. See id. at 289-90.
65. Id. at 299.
66. See id. at 302. Essentially the Court ruled that the restriction was not facially
discriminatory and, although the handicapped might be impacted, it was not impermissible for the State to mandate the restriction. See id. at 292-309.
67. See id. at 300.
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term 'affirmative action' referred to those 'changes,' 'adjustments,' or
'modifications' to existing programs that would be 'substantial,' or
that would constitute fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of a program,... rather than to those changes that would be reasonable accommodations."6 8 The Court further elucidated that it was the duty
of the implementing agency to identify and police those instances
where a refusal to reasonably accommodate a handicapped individual
is discriminatory.6 9 Again, the Court emphasized that the Rehabilitation Act intended to provide evenhanded treatment of the handicapped; it did not guarantee equal results.70 By clarifying
Southeastern, Alexander reintroduced the necessity of reasonable accommodation to the Act and harmonized
Southeastern with the com7
peting interests espoused in Alexander. '
3.

School Board of Nassau County v. Arline

In the final case of the trilogy, School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline,7 2 the Court broadened the definition of handicap, but it also
restricted an individual's ability to meet the otherwise qualified requirement. Arline was a school teacher with a history of tuberculosis; 73 consequently, the school board terminated Arline's employment
not citing her diminished capacity, but the fear associated with the
contagion. 4
Addressing the statutory language and the precedent of Alexander,
the Court proceeded by reiterating that "only those individuals who
are both [(1)] handicapped and [(2)] otherwise qualified are eligible
for relief."7 5 Over a strong dissent,76 the Court ruled that contagious
diseases are a handicap under the statute. 77 The opinion carefully articulates that distinguishing between discrimination based on fear of a
contagion and discrimination based on the limitations arising from the
disease is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.78 The majority
stated, "Nothing in the legislative history of § 504 suggests that Congress intended such a result [allowing for discrimination based on
68. Id. at 301 n.20 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
69. See id. at 300 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
413 (1979)).
70. See id. at 304.
71. See supra text accompanying note 64.
72. 480 U.S. 273 (1986).
73. See id. at 281.
74. See id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 15-16, School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1986)).
75. Id. at 285.
76. See id. at 289 (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting) (challenging the validity of expanding the definition of handicapped since entities forced into compliance
were held so under a quasi-contractual basis and those entities could not knowingly
have accepted the expanded definition as part of exchange for federal assistance).
77. See id. at 285-86.
78. See id. at 284.
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fear]. That history demonstrates that Congress was as concerned
about the effect of an impairment on others as it was about its effect
on the individual."79 Finding Congressional intent sufficiently broad
to include Arline, the Court repeatedly cites to the Act's history as the
foundation for its decision.8"
After finding Arline within the statutory definition of disabled, the
Court moved to determine whether she was otherwise qualified. The
Court reiterated the basic factor considered in conducting this inquiry,
whether an individual "is able to meet all of a program's requirements
in spite of his handicap."8 1 In the employment context, an otherwise
qualified person is one who can perform the essentialfunctions of the
job in question.8 2 Arline was fully qualified to teach. The School
Board, rather than exposing the students to the contagion, chose to
prevent Arline from teaching. Stripped of her ability to interact and,
therefore, teach, Arline could not perform the essential functions of
the position. When a handicapped individual is unable to perform the
essential functions of the job, then "the court must also consider
whether any 'reasonable accommodation' by the employer would enable the handicapped person to perform those functions."8 3 However,
any accommodation that "either imposes 'undue financial and administrative burdens' on a grantee, or requires 'a fundamental alteration
in the nature of [the] program"84 is unreasonable. In its inquiry, the
Court evaluated, in light of the holding and medical findings,
"whether the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee
under the established standards for that inquiry."8 5 With regard to a
contagious disease, the Court found that deference should normally
be given to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials.86 Regarding the reasonableness of accommodation, the Court
implied these medical determinations would be conclusive, but not
irrefutable.
In discussing whether Arline met the second element necessary for
statutory protection, the otherwise qualified prong, the Court found
that although Arline was handicapped, from the record it could not
determine if she was otherwise qualified.87 The Court found the record insufficient regarding the duration and extent of Arline's condition, and it did not address the probability of transmitting the disease
79. Id. at 282.
80. See id. at 282-83 & n.9.
81. Id. at 287 n.17 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.

397, 406 (1979)).
82. See id. See also supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
83. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 (citation omitted).
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
86. See id. at 288. The Court did not address whether courts should also defer to
the reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on whom the employer has
relied. See id. at n.18.
87. See id. at 288-89.
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or whether the School Board could reasonably accommodate Arline's
condition.88 This deficiency mandated the Court's remand for a determination of additional facts. Although unable to conduct an inquiry,
the decision does provide guidance for subsequent judicial inquiries.
The Arline Court instructed lower courts to conduct individualized
findings, because "[s]uch an inquiry is essential if section 504 is to
achieve its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving
appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding
exposing others to significant health and safety risks."89 Arline's holding clearly extends otherwise qualified analysis to include the safety of
others as an additional factor in a court's analysis. 90
C. Americans with DisabilitiesAct

In an effort to expand the reach of protection for the handicapped, 91 Congress, using its nearly plenary power granted under the
Commerce Clause," enacted the ADA.9 3 Enactment pursuant to the
Commerce Clause allows regulation of private industry, as well as

those entities presently regulated by section 504. The ADA claims to

extend protection to approximately 43 million Americans9 4 and

clearly contemplates the protected class will grow as the American
population ages. 95 The Act encompasses all employers with fifteen or

more employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar
weeks per year. 96 Congress made an additional distinction between
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by substituting the word disabilities

for handicaps but intended no change in the meaning, definition, or
88. See id.
89. Id. at 287. On remand the trial court found "the probability that Arline would
transmit tuberculosis to anyone was so extremely small as not to exist." Arline v.
School Bd. of Nassau County, 692 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
90. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16 (stating when an individual actually poses significant risk of communicating a disease, if reasonable accommodations will not eliminate the risk of transmission, then that individual is not otherwise qualified). This
decision is interesting because its findings are only remotely dependant on Arline.
Determination of Arline's disability is in reference to the impact (the fear) it had on
others. See id. at 284-85. Also, whether Arline was otherwise qualified is determined
in reference to others. See id. at 287 n.16.
91. Although legislation proscribing discrimination against the disabled had been
enacted, studies and polls indicated that individuals with disabilities still experienced
higher levels of unemployment and poverty. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 314.
92. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (imposing the first judicial
restraint on congressional commerce power in nearly 60 years).
93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3 (granting Congress power to regulate interstate commerce).
94. Using 1990 census figures, this is roughly 2.5 times the population of Texas.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1) (1994).
96. See id. § 12111(5)(A).
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application.97 One other small change is noted. The Act states a
"covered entity shall [not] discriminate against a qualified individual."9 The qualified individual is the equivalent of the Rehabilitation
Act's otherwise qualified individual. 99

The ADA is comprised of six titles, each focusing on a specific area
of society, thereby attempting to afford greater protection to the disabled. 10 The Act also divides enforcement of the titles among various agencies. Title 111 is targeted at reducing discrimination in the
employment sector 10 2 and charges the EEOC with implementing regulations and enforcement.10 3 Titles 11104 and 111105 prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals in the access to, and supply of,

public services. Title II targets government agencies, and Title III encompasses non-governmental agencies. 1 6 Endeavoring to provide the

disabled with greater access to existing telecommunications systems,
Title IV was enacted. 107 Title V provides general application rules

and specific afflictions or conditions that are not protected under the
Act.10 8 Homosexuals, transvestites, and bisexuals are expressly
deemed not impaired under the act and therefore beyond the ambit of
the statute's protection.109 Individuals currently engaged in illegal use
of drugs are also exempted from statutory protection.1 1 0
It is important to note that the ADA does not replace the Rehabilitation Act; those entities satisfying the jurisdictional elements of each
are subject to both statutes.11 1 The ADA is significantly analogous to
the Rehabilitation Act; consequently, Congress mandates that statutory interpretation arising under the Rehabilitation Act should provide guidance for the ADA. 112 Congress also mandates that the ADA
not be interpreted as providing lesser standards or requirements than

97. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.1(a) (1996) (recognizing that individuals with disabilities were sensitive to the terminology used to describe them). See H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 3, at 25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 314. Analogizing to
racial epithets, the nomenclature applied to these individuals is "overlaid with stereotypes, patronizing attitudes, and other emotional connotations." Id. at 333.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
99. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) with supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
100. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
101. See id. § 12111.
102. See id. §§ 12111-12117.
103. See id. § 12117.
104. See id. §§ 12131-12165.
105. See id. §§ 12181-12189.
106. See id. §§ 12182, 12184.
107. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (1994).
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213.
109. See id. §§ 12208, 12211.
110. See id. § 12210.
111. See id. § 12201. As an example of a claim under both Acts see Roth v. Lutheran General Hospital, 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (stating that ADA is not to be construed as imposing
lesser standards than those the Rehabilitation Act impose).
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those of the Rehabilitation Act.' 13 Thus, the concepts of reasonable
accommodation and essentialfunctions are adopted into the ADA.
D.

Chandler and Coghlan

The following cases are intertwined in reasoning and judgments. In
reaching their decisions, the courts often interchange or extrapolate
from the precedents and enforcement of the other Act. These cases
are at the foundation of many decisions that undermine the goals of
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. These cases, by measuring disabilities post-mitigation, adversely impact the scope and goal of providing
protection for the disabled.
1. Chandler v. City of Dallas
In Chandler v. City of Dallas,1 1 4 the city, motivated by safety concerns, instituted a program' 5 mandating certain physical requirements for its employees whose job entailed driving on public roads." 6
The program automatically disqualified any employee from a position
17
of primary driver if certain physical requirements were not met."
The plaintiffs, two city employees, filed a class action suit claiming,
inter alia, violation of the Rehabilitation Act."' The complaint attacked several of the program's requirements, specifically, those mandating that drivers: "cannot have an established medical history of
diabetes mellitus severe enough to require insulin for control; and [ ]
must have 20/40 vision (corrected) and a field of vision of at least 70
degrees in the horizontal meridian in each eye."'' One plaintiff,
Maddox, had vision that was not correctable to the city's standards,
and the second plaintiff, Chandler, was insulin-dependent. 20 At trial,
judgment was granted to both plaintiffs' 2 1 but on appeal the decision
was overturned.' 2 2 The appellate court set forth standards to prove a
prima facie case:
[t]o qualify for relief under this statute, a plaintiff must prove that
(1) he was an "individual with handicaps"; (2) he was "otherwise
qualified"; (3) he worked for a "program or activity" that received
federal financial assistance; and (4) he was adversely treated solely
113.
114.
115.
of the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
it was

See id.
2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993).
See id. at 1388 (patterning Administrative Directive 3-3 on safety regulations
U.S. Dept. of Transportation).
See id. This was designated as a Primary Driver position.
See id.
See id. at 1389.
Id. at 1388.
See id. at 1388-89.
See id. at 1389.
See id. at 1397. The case was remanded to the trial court, and, once reinstated,
overturned on a second appeal.
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because of his handicap. [And] [tihe burden of proof for each of
these elements lies with the plaintiff.1 23

The Act defines a person with handicaps as "any person who (i) has
a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities."1'24 But the Act does not
define "impairment," "substantially limited," or "major life activities."

Recognizing that the Rehabilitation Act did not fully define the term
person with handicaps, the court consulted the Department of Health
and Human Services' ("HHS") regulations and definitions, as the
Supreme Court had in Arline."2 5 These regulations define impairment
as "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfiguration, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine."' 26 Building on the
definition, the regulations define major life activities as "functions
such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,1' walking,
seeing,
27
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

In dealing with Maddox's vision claim, the Fifth Circuit referenced
its earlier decision in Collier v. City of Dallas.2 ' In Collier, the court
found that vision, that is correctable to 20/200, is simply not a handicap. 129 In applying the standard from Collier,coupled with Maddox's
testimony that he felt unrestricted in the performance of his major life
activities,130 the court concluded that his vision, which was correctable
123. Id. at 1390 (citing Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir.
1991) (footnote omitted); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).
125. See Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1390.

126. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1992)).
127. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)).
128. See id. (citing Collier v. City of Dallas, 798 F.2d 1410 (5th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished).
129. See id.

130. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1993). Author's
note: The sole purpose of these statutes is to provide a method for the disabled to
better themselves and to reduce the stigmas associated with their conditions. This
group has long battled their afflictions and the preconceived ideas attached to them.
Emphasizing the desire and capabilities of the disabled to function in society is the
purpose of the legislation. In fact, the legislative history is filled with testimony of the
effects on individuals. Powerful and moving statements relating the effects of discrimination include: "Disability does not mean incompetence. The perception that persons with disabilities are dependant by nature is the result of discriminatory attitudes,
not the result of disability." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 25 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 323. Other testimony explained:
For far too long ... disabled people have felt the pain of discrimination, of

being held separate, at being looked at as different, as somehow being
viewed as lessor ...[the speaker testified to feeling] the discrimination, the

isolation, the sense of helplessness and the sense of no ability to relate to
other people because they have shut me out.
Id. at 323.
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to 20/60, did not constitute a handicap.1 3 Although the city established physical criteria for employment, the court simply denied statutory protection by arbitrarily defining the employee's vision as
normal. Importantly, the Chandler court, following Collier, clearly
considered the effects of the disability after a corrective measure.
Unlike the simple application of a predetermined measurement or
the cursory analytical approach taken with Maddox's disability claim,
the court undertook some analysis when addressing Chandler's diabetes claim. Again, using a post-correction measurement, the court
found that Chandler could not establish that any of his major life activities were substantially limited, thereby placing him outside the statutory definition. 32
Next, the court addressed the argument that insulin-dependent diabetes is a disability per se. Acknowledging lack of guidance from the
Rehabilitation Act, court precedents, and HHS regulations, the court,
at the urging of the plaintiffs, consulted EEOC regulations and its interpretive guide to the ADA.' 3 3 These interpretive guidelines, when
discussing the term substantially limited, state that a diabetic, dependent on insulin, is substantially limited because without such medication no major life activities can be performed. 134 The court agreed
with the plaintiff and acknowledged the EEOC's determination that
insulin-dependent diabetics are disabled in fact, but it questioned
whether that determination, pursuant to the ADA, mandated a similar
adoption under the Rehabilitation Act.1 35 The court avoided ruling
on this issue and instead dismissed Chandler's claim as failing under
the otherwise qualified requirement of section 504, finding that the job
had valid essentialfunctions and no reasonable modification was available. 3 6 The city's essential functions were safety requirements that
Other testimony speaks of being robbed of dignity and self-respect. Swallowing insults on routine basis and attempting to incorporate into society. See id. "It is the
elimination of dignity associated with being a human being that I am talking about."
Id. The point is vividly driven home by Judith Heuman's testimony, when she stated,
"In the past disability has been the cause of shame. This forced acceptance of secondclass citizenship has stripped us as disabled people of pride and dignity .... This
stigma scars for life." Id. at 324 (omission in original). With the long history of oppression and discrimination, it seems odd that a court would assume or expect such an
individual to testify in court that he feels disabled or handicapped.
131. See Chandler,2 F.3d. at 1390 (deciding no handicap is possible for 20/60 vision
after a previous decision found that 20/200 vision is not a handicap). See also Collier,
798 F.2d at 1410.
132. See Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1390-91. Although dicta, based on Collier's previous
post correction measurement of vision the Chandler court also measured Chandler's
disability after mitigating measures were taken. See id.
133. See id. at 1391 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 Appendix to part 1630-Interpretive
Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act). The similar language
and congressional mandate allow courts to interchange the precedent of the two
statutes.
134. See Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1391 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1996)).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 1389.
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were modeled after Department of Transportation regulations. 137 The
court found safety was an essential function for the city's drivers, thus
without the availability of a reasonablemodification, Chandler failed

the otherwise qualified requirement. Although it appears Chandler
passed the first statutory barrier-recognition of a disability, the court
jumped to the second obstacle-otherwise qualified-and denied relief. 138 The appellate court ultimately ruled in favor of the City of
Dallas on all claims.
2.

Coghlan-ADA

In construing the ADA, a court faced with similar issues found the
EEOC's apparent acceptance of diabetes as a disability per se contrary to the plain language of the statute. 139 In Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz
Co., an insulin-dependent diabetic was terminated from his job and
refused employment at a subsidiary company.1 40 The plaintiff based
his claim on several anti-discrimination statutes,' 4 ' including the
ADA.

The court recognized that the ADA's purpose was to prohibit discrimination against "a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability ...

in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,

advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ143
ment."'1 42 The court consulted the EEOC's interpretive guidelines,
as discussed in Chandler,1 44 that suggested insulin-dependentdiabetics

are disabled in fact. The court appeared to acquiesce in the agency's
definition of substantially limited but found the guidelines overly
broad45in postulating that all other requirements of the statute were
met.'

See id. at 1388.
See id. at 1395.
See Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
See id. at 809-10.
See id. at 815 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (age discrimination)); TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1993) (Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act [TCHRA]).
142. Coghlan, 851 F. Supp. at 811 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)).
143. See id. at 813 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (j) (1993)).
144. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
145. See Coghlan, 851 F. Supp. at 812. It goes unstated that this guideline does not
address "qualified individual" or the other elements necessary in defining a disability.
But a simple analysis reveals flaws in the court's logic. First, the court need not address "qualified" until a disability is established. See supra text accompanying note
123. So, the court should begin with defining disability-a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting a major life activity. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
The court concedes the accuracy of the substantially limited guideline; therefore,
any additional arguments based on the temporary nature of a coma are not valid.
Obviously, there is an impairment. Diabetes is a physical impairment affecting one's
pancreas. The only remaining element is to determine if this substantially limiting
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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Beginning its evaluation of Coghlan, the court established the definition of disabled-an individual substantially limited in a major life
activity. 146 The court focused on the term limited and determined that
a properly medicated functioning diabetic could not be limited for purposes of the Act.' 47 Essentially, a medicated and functioning diabetic
is not limited; therefore, the court questioned when limited applied. 48
Stating that it was a necessary part of the statutory definition, the
court chose to apply limited to the subsequent mitigated condition.14 9
Finding the interpretive guidelines not binding, the court noted that
regulations issued under, and in compliance with, properly delegated
authority have the force of law, but recognized agency interpretations
as simply reminders to the parties of their duties. 5 ° Dismissing the
argument that the EEOC's interpretation was borne out in legislative
history of the statute, the court refused to consult legislative history. 5 '
The court found the EEOC's guidelines in violation of the statutory
language, and therefore found the EEOC's interpretation, creating a
disability per se, invalid.' 5 2 In a near about-face, the court then
opined about the possibility of diabetes being a disability per se, reasoning it lacked sufficient medical knowledge to refute such a determination. 53 Finally, resting its decision on what it found to be
unambiguous statutory language, the court rejected the EEOC's interpretation. Continuing its equivocal pattern and stressing a desire not
to make a judgment regarding the plaintiff's affliction, the
court dis54
missed the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
II. ANALYSIS
While the Chandlerand Coghlan decisions are not isolated in their
holdings, they significantly threaten the statutes' purpose and goals of
protecting disabled individuals from discrimination in the workplace.
Congress, in outlining its findings and purposes, intended to establish
clear, strong, and enforceable standards to eliminate discrimination
impairment affects a major life activity. It seems highly likely that a coma affects
every major life activity.
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
147. See id. at 813.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 812 (citing Jerri's Ceramic Arts Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 874 F.2d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1989)).
151. See id. (citing Guilzon v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 819, 823-24 n.11 (5th Cir.
1993) (paraphrasing Justice Holmes's statement that courts do not inquire what Congress meant; they only ask what it said. The court restated the Fifth Circuit's policy of
not deferring to extrinsic aids when, statutory language is unambiguous)).
152. See id. at 813.
153. See id. at 813-14.
154. See id. at 814-15. The court found sufficient evidence to survive the motion,
since the plaintiff's affliction, even with medication, affected his major life activities.
See id. Also the court noted that sleeping and eating habits were still affected because
of hypoglycemic reactions to the insulin. See id.
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faced by individuals with disabilities.155 The Alexander Court required following these statutory objectives.' 56 Chandler's and Coghlan's decisions fail to achieve any meaningful balance between the
dual objectives set forth in Alexander1 57 and raise serious obstacles to
individuals claiming redress. In order to give meaning to these statutes, it is necessary that courts adopt the EEOC's pre-mitigation measurement of a disability.
A.

Mitigated or Not Mitigated

In determining whether an individual is disabled within the meanings of the statutes, courts must assess whether the impairment substantially limits any major life activity. However, recognition of
whether a disability exists determines only who may bring a claim.
The second barrier of otherwise qualified counterbalances the employee's interest with the employer's interest. The answer to the first
question, whether disability exists, according to Coghlan and other
courts, turns on whether the individual was receiving treatment or
medication when the employer committed the wrongful conduct. This
post-mitigation measurement may penalize a person for seeking treatment because his major life activities may no longer be substantially
limited. Conversely, the statutes may protect a person who fails to
seek treatment because his major life activities remain substantially
limited.
Post-mitigation measurement is short-sighted. It fails to examine
the delicate interaction and subtle balance between recognizing an individual with a disability and determining whether an individual is
otherwise qualified. Post-mitigation measurement penalizes individuals who attempt to lessen the physical and social impact these impairments have on their lives.158 In some cases, these mitigating steps may
be required in order for the individual to sustain the eventual otherwise qualified challenge.

If mitigating steps are necessary to raise the individual to the otherwise qualified level, the resulting mitigation of the disability may also
foreclose the possibility for redress. On the other hand, if no mitigation is taken, the employer may discriminate, because the individual is
not otherwise qualified for the position. The practice of subsequently
measuring an impairment's effect ultimately forces an individual to
choose which statutory element they prefer to fail. Post-mitigation
measurement is obviously inconsistent with the expressed Congressional intent of a "clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."' 59
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (2) (1994).
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985).
See supra text accompanying note 64.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
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B. Post-MitigationPenalizes
Post-mitigation measurement, coupled with the otherwise qualified
requirement, serves to drastically narrow the class of individuals protected by the statutes. The statutes are written to protect three categories of people: "those with (A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment., 160 However, the disabled individual's desire to
better his situation may actually prevent an individual from functioning in employment and from participating in programs or receiving
protection. The threshold requirement in any claim is that the plaintiff establish a disability under one of these categories; then, and only
then, can the plaintiff provide or meet the necessary functions of the
job.1 6 ' Thus, an individual must fit through a narrow stricture to invoke protection. In other words, in order to meet the threshold requirement of being disabled, the plaintiff must show that a major life
activity is substantially impaired. Yet, simultaneously the claimant
must prove that despite his impairment, he is able to perform the essential functions of the job in order to meet the otherwise qualified
standard. To complicate matters further, where he falls on this sliding
scale is obviously related to, and affected by, whether he is receiving
treatment.
As an example, if an insulin-dependent diabetic applies for a position and is discriminated against, in order to seek redress under the
statute, he must first prove he is disabled-substantially limited in a
major life activity. If that individual does not take insulin, then he will
lapse into a coma, and since a coma substantially limits all major life
activities, this should establish a disability. But, the second elementessential functions-requires proving he is otherwise qualified to perform the job. To continue the example, an individual in a coma cannot perform any job functions and therefore is denied statutory
protection, because he is not otherwise qualified.'62 Using a post-mitigation measurement creates a paradox, because, if the individual receives medication, he is able to meet the otherwise qualified
requirement but is denied protection because he is no longer substantially limited by his disability. a63 Therefore, an insulin-dependent dia160. See id. § 12102(2)(A)-(C); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).
161. See supra text at Part I.B.4. See also supra text accompanying note 123.
162. See, e.g., Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 760 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that attendance is an essential function); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d
278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding indefinite leave not a reasonable accommodation);
Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
attendance is an essential function); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that attendance is an essential function).
163. It might be argued that a plaintiff could meet the "record of impairment" standard. However, this argument is specious at best. Regardless, if there is no history of
hospitalization, are courts going to require individuals to jeopardize their lives in or-
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betic could rarely qualify for statutory protection under the first prong
of the definition of disabled. A post-mitigated evaluation, combined
with the otherwise qualified requirement, places disabled individuals
in an untenable stricture, and the only definable standard created by
measuring post-mitigation would be the exclusion of legal remedies to
disabled individuals attempting to combat their conditions.
To qualify under the statute, the Chandler and Coghlan decisions
require the plaintiff to show some additional limitation after a mitigating measure is taken.16 4 While some individuals may prevail by showing additional limitations, this is too narrow an interpretation of the
statute. Although the earlier hypothetical may appear remote or unlikely, comparable arguments and reasoning are found in Schluter v.
IndustrialCoils, Inc.'6 5 The Schluter court based its holding on Coghlan and similar decisions. Following Coghlan, the Schluter court
states:
[i]f an insulin-dependent diabetic can control her condition with the
use of insulin or a near-sighted person can correct her vision with
eyeglasses or contact lenses, she cannot argue that her life is substantially limited by her condition. To say that a person who needs
insulin or eyeglasses is disabled in fact is to read out of the act's first
definition of disability the requirement that it applies only to those
166
persons who are "substantially limited" in major life activities.
The court also ruled that insulin reactions, the fact question that
saved Coghlan from summary judgment, are too remote and vague for
a substantially limited finding. 167 The court added, that even if a diabetic was currently experiencing sleeping and eating difficulties arising
from an insulin reaction, a plaintiff must demonstrate how these diffider to fit one of the definitions? Cf. Schluter v. Industrial Coils Inc., 928 F. Supp.
1437, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (failing to require plaintiff to demonstrate the effects of
insulin deprivation after defendant requested proof of disability).
164. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390-91 (5th Cir. 1993); Coghlan v.
H.J. Heinz, 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
165. 928 F. Supp. 1437 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
166. Id. at 1445. Following this logic, assume that X has extremely poor vision (i.e.
sufficient to meet the disabled requirement) but still meets the "essential functions"
requirement. X is disabled any time his glasses are removed. However, this is not
true when X wears his glasses, because his vision is corrected to 20/20. This reasoning
allows an individual to fluctuate between states of being disabled or not disabled during a single day. Litigation would require a determination of whether plaintiff was
wearing lenses when the discrimination actually occurred. The court has created an
inverse Superman. His only disguise, the glasses that completely conceal his true
identity. While worn, he is strong, capable, functioning and completely invulnerable
to discrimination. However, when removed, his true identity is revealed and he becomes susceptible to discrimination. Therefore, employers must recognize Xs vulnerability and only discriminate when he is without his glasses.
It is also a little ironic that if X is disabled but not capable of meeting the "otherwise qualified" element, then the outcome can be summarized as: if his vision is so
poor that he cannot see you discriminate, then it is not illegal.
167. See id. at 1446.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

21

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 4 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 4

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

culties are worse than for the average person. 168 Here, the Schluter
court further restricted a plaintiff's ability to prove even a post-mitigation limitation.
According to Schluter, and following the reasoning of Chandler and
Coghlan, when an individual takes steps to alleviate a disability in an
attempt to meet the otherwise qualified element or simply improve his
quality of life, he may also foreclose the possibility of statutory protection.16 9 Continuing to follow this reasoning upsets the delicate balance between recognition of a disabled individual and an individual
who is otherwise qualified.
C.

Deference to EEOC

The Coghlan court followed the well-established principle that no
deference is given to an agency's interpretation of a statute if that interpretation is contrary to the statute's plain language.17 ° It should be
noted that Coghlan dealt with interpretative guidelines rather than
regulations. While it is accepted that these guidelines are given less
weight than regulations,' 7 ' it is implicit in the statement that interpretive guidelines are given some measure of deference. Coghlan gave
none. Only after deciding to measure post-mitigation, the court addressed the EEOC's guidelines. The court incorrectly reasoned that
the EEOC created a disability per se. 172 The guidelines, however,
clearly state an intention not to create a "laundry list" of disabilities. 17 3 The agency lucidly stated that a diagnosis does not establish a
disability; only the effects of the impairment on an individual can establish a disability. 174 By stating, "Some impairments may be more
disabling for particular individuals than others, depending on the
stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impairments
that combine to make the impairment disabling or any number of
other factors,' 7 5 it is obvious the agency will make a determination
on a case by case analysis. The diabetic example, cited by plaintiffs, 7 6
168. See id. See also Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Forrisi
v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)) (commonplace conditions are not
impairments).
169. See supra Part II.A.
170. See Coghlan, 851 F. Supp. at 812. See also Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505
U.S. 469, 474 (1992).
171. See generally General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Jerri's Ceramic
Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 874 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging regulations pursuant to statutory authority have the force of law but interpretive guidelines do not require equal deference).
172. This is likely based on the dicta found in Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d
1385 (5th Cir. 1993).
173. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1996).
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. See Coghlan, 851 F. Supp. at 812 ("A diabetic who without insulin would lapse
into a coma would be substantially limited because the individual cannot perform
major life activities without the aid of medication.").
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certainly requires the factfinder to establish that the diabetes is sufficiently advanced and life threatening in order to be substantially limiting. According to the guidelines, the diabetes must be sufficiently
advanced that, absent medication, a coma is imminent. 177 What the
court fails to recognize is that if all insulin-dependent diabetics are
substantially limited in a major life activity, the outcome may be identical, but it is not the creation of a disability per se. 178 Based on the
court's incorrect determination that the guideline is contrary to the
statute, the question becomes how much deference should the court
afford these guidelines.
The amount of deference given by a court to an agency's guidelines
is controlled by factors that include internal consistency, contemporaneous passage of the guidelines and the statute, and the validity of the
guidelines' reasoning. 179 The EEOC's guidelines are clearly in harmony with the statutory language and legislative intent. Here, these
factors are present, including ample legislative history to support the
validity of the agency's interpretation. Such history clearly establishes
that disabilities are measured without regard to mitigating measures. 80 It states, "The impairment should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or
reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial
limitation."18 '
In fact, several of the examples used by the EEOC are nearly identical to those found in the statute's legislative history. 82 As an example, the history states, "persons with impairments, such as... diabetes,
which substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the
first prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication."' 83 The history indicates that
the impairment must substantially limit a major life activity, but that
determination is without regard to mitigating measures. 84 Accordingly, the EEOC's determination to measure without regard to mitigation does not read limitation out of the statute, as stated in Coghlan.
The statute is worded appropriately, and the EEOC's interpretation
177. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j). This dependency is readily proven by medical
testimony. Thus, mild or early stages might not be a disability.
178. It is doubtful that any court would find a paraplegic is not substantially limited
in a major life activity. Strictly following Coghlan's reasoning, such is the creation of
a disability per se.
179. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); Shalala v. St. Paul-Ramsey Med. Ctr., 50 F.3d 522, 527 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995).
180. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 334; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 447.
181. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 1, at 28, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 451.
182. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
334.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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traces Congress's intent. According to the EEOC, a court is still required to determine if impairment substantially limits a major life activity, before that impairment constitutes a disability under the
statute. 18 5 The EEOC simply finds that the determination
should be
1 86
done before any mitigating measures are taken.

D. Statutory Construction-When Agency Interpretations
Are Disregarded

Like the situation in Coghlan, when no deference is afforded to an
agency's interpretation, the court must interpret the statute. However, the Supreme Court directs that courts are not to interpret statutes when the legislature's intent is readily apparent from the
statutory language.1 87 Here, the Coghlan court simply declared the

language of the statute unambiguous and, therefore, not subject to
construction.'

88

of construction,

Under the pretext of following this established canon

89

the Coghlan court erred by its strict adherence to

the canon and not consulting the available legislative history.1 90

While recognized as the most settled cannon of construction, this cannot be taken literally because statutes are subject to interpretation
and review through the entire appellate process.1 91 The Supreme

Court has also stated:
while the rule [ejusdem generis] is a well-established and useful one,
it is, like other cannons of statutory construction, only an aid to the
ascertainmentof the true meaning of the statute. It is neitherfinal nor

exclusive. To ascertain the meaning of the words of a statute, they
may be submitted to the test of all appropriate cannons of statutory
construction .... 192

Although referencing another construction technique, the statement highlights the fact that the Supreme Court finds no single canon
or interpretive aid as dispositive. Canons are simply tools, and courts
185. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1996). Compare Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir.
1995); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630, §1630.2(h), (j)), with Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53
F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that impairment alone is not enough to be a
disability-the impairment must substantially limit a major life activity).
186. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1996).
187. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
188. See id.
189. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION
§ 46.01 at 81 (5th ed. 1992).
190. It may appear as if this author is simply choosing one interpretive technique
over another; however, courts make such choices on a regular basis. See Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 800, 806 (1983) (criticizing strict adherence to canons when there is a "competing canon" that would achieve an opposite result).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Canadian Vinyl Indus., 555 F.2d 806 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
192. Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934) (emphasis
added).
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should use all appropriate tools available. Clearly, if other statutory
aids will assist in the interpretation of statutes, courts should never
blindly foreclose use of those alternative aids. Several other canons
and maxims of construction were available to, but neglected in, Coghlan's interpretation of the ADA and EEOC guidelines. Those aids
would have guided the court to the appropriate determination of
Coghlan's impairment and recognition of the validity of the EEOC's
interpretive guidelines.
Furthermore, there are well-established exceptions to the rule of
not interpreting statutory language when the meaning of a statute is
patently clear.1 93 One such exception is when a plaintiff can demonstrate in the legislative history that Congress intended a different
meaning. 194 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled that
even if a statute appears unambiguous on its face, courts may still consult legislative history if the plain meaning is "at variance with the
'
policy of the statute as a whole."195
Post-mitigation measurement is
clearly an example of such an exception; moreover, the language of
§ 12101 clearly shows a strong intention of the legislature to provide
broad coverage. 96 More specifically, the history demonstrates a Congressional intent of determining impairments without regard to mitigation.1 97 Although Congress did not enumerate impairments,
reasoning a comprehensive list was not possible, the legislative history
does address the exact issues in question and supports the EEOC's
interpretation. 198 The history specifically mentions several readily apparent conditions, including diabetes, that it reasoned were disabilities.1 99 The history certainly demonstrates that the legislature was
mindful of and expecting the measure of handicaps to occur without
regard to the use of mitigating measures.2°
Additionally, departure from literal construction is demanded when
that construction would produce absurd or unjust results and would
clearly be inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act.2° '
Coghlan's literal interpretation denies statutory protection to those individuals who have taken necessary measures to improve their condition and thereby increase their chances of employment. Here, the
elimination or emasculation of a category of individuals who deserve
protection produces an unjust and absurd result. All of these addi193. See SINGER, supra note 189, § 46.01 at 82.
194. See Anderson v. Black & Decker Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Ky. 1984).
195. Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
197. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
198. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2 at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 334.
199. See id.
200. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
201. See SINGER, supra note 189, § 45.12 at 61; see generally State of Alaska v. Babbit, 38 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1994); Brown & Root v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.
1984).
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tional canons and statutory construction aids were applicable to Coghlan's analysis but were not employed, leading to the court's erroneous
construction.
Furthermore, it is not at all obvious that the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous. This is the touchstone in determining that a
statute is not to be interpreted. There are several factors used to determine whether statutory language is ambiguous. The Coghlan court
itself cannot define limits, stating "Although 'limitation' may carry different shades of meaning, it cannot be meaningless .... "202 By implying that limits had to mean something,20 3 the court is apparently
attempting to apply the maxim that every word be given effect. 20 4 The
court's own inability to pinpoint a meaning arguably establishes that
the statute's language did not clearly and unequivocally express congressional intent. Rather than interpreting the statutory language, the
court incorrectly perceived the EEOC as trying to eliminate the word
and failed to realize the EEOC is still giving the word full effect. The
agency, following Congress's expressed intent in the history, ascertained the appropriate meaning of limits.
The fact that courts have interpreted the same statutes or regulations differently 2 5 is also evidence of ambiguity. 0 6 Although Chandler measured limitations after the use of mitigating measures, the
court clearly found that the EEOC considers insulin-dependent diabetes a disability in and of itself under the ADA.20 7 Other courts have
also held that pre-mitigation is the proper time to measure a disability.20 Obviously, the Coghlan court was incapable of defining limits,
and Chandler interpreted the guidelines differently than Coghlan, thus
demonstrating that the statutory language is not unambiguous. Therefore, the Coghlan court was not prohibited by any construction canon
from addressing the legislative history.
Finally, the court should have followed the Supreme Court's direction in Southeastern when it consulted the legislative history to define
a disability. The Court looked at the policy for the statute and determined that excluding a disease was inconsistent with Congressional
intent. Just as a contagious disease does not remove an individual
from the definition of disabled, 20 9 neither should a medically treated
impairment preclude statutory protection.
202. Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
203. See id. at 812-13.
204. See SINGER, supra note 189, § 46.06, at 119.
205. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir.
1982); Sarsycki v. UPS, 862 F. Supp. 336, 340 (W.D. Okla. 1994); Davis v. Meese, 692
F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Penn. 1988), affd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
206. See Marathon Le Tourneau Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (S.D.
Miss. 1976).
207. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993).
208. See infra Part ILE.
209. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 258-86 (1986).
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During its evaluation of HEW regulations, the Court repeated the
rule strictly adhered to in Coghlan to honor the clear meaning of the
statute. Importantly, the Court stated that meaning is revealed by its
language, purpose, and history.2 1 ° Clearly, Southeastern sanctions the
use of legislative intent and history when interpreting these statutes.
E. Supporting Case Law
Statutory construction is only one method to support the proposition that impairments should be measured without regard to aids,
medicines, or prosthetics. Ample case law exists contradicting the
2 1 1 and provides alternative
reasoning found in Coghlan and Chandler,
decisions and reasoning that support the EEOC's position. Rather
than framing the issue as the EEOC's creation of a disability per se,
these courts recognize the distinction and importance of a pre-mitigation evaluation. Although the outcome may be identical if all insulindependent diabetics are substantially limited, this outcome is precisely
the one intended by Congress. The Courts of Appeal for the Third
and Seventh Circuits have addressed when to measure an impairment. 212 In Davis v. Meese,21 3 the court finds that "an insulin-dependent diabetic is clearly a 'handicapped person'" under the
Rehabilitation Act. 1 4 In Meese, the nucleus of the action was the
2 15
FBI's exclusion of all insulin-dependent diabetics as field agents.
The Meese court ruled that a plaintiff may not be excluded due to a
handicap if he is otherwise qualified, and that determination requires
an individual fact-specific inquiry. 216 The court found blanket exclusions establishing irrebuttable presumptions of disqualification violate
the Rehabilitation Act and the Due Process clause, unless the exclusions are founded on narrowly tailored restrictions, based on essential
functions.21 7 The Meese court correctly evaluated the plaintiff's condition and then applied the otherwise qualified element.
2 18
The Seventh Circuit, in Roth v. Lutheran General Hospital,
clearly stated that courts are not to look at mitigating measures such
as medicines or assistive prosthetics when determining impairment.1 9
The court distinguished between simply using a device for conven210. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979) (quoting
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1970)).
211. See Bentivegna, 694 F.2d at 621; Sarsycki, 862 F. Supp. at 340; Meese, 692 F.
Supp. at 517.
212. See Davis v. Meese, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1.446 (7th Cir. 1995).
213. 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Penn. 1988), affd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989) (per
curiam).
214. Id. at 517.
215. See id. at 506-07.
216. See id. at 517.
217. See id. at 517-18.
218. 57 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1995).
219. See id. at 1454 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h), (j) (1995) (amended 1996)).
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ience or mitigation of a non-substantially limiting impairment and

those that are substantially limiting. 220 The court recognized that all
impairments do not sufficiently impact a major life activity, thereby
rising to the level of a disability. 221 According to Roth, "[t]he key is
the extent to which the impairment restricts a major life activity; the
impairment must be a significant one. ' 222 The court correctly found
that in order for statutory protection to attach, the impairment, and
not the mitigating measure, determines a disability.223 Accordingly,
the proper determination for the court is to establish the disability
regardless of the use of aids.
This reasoning is further supported by Ferguson v. Western Carolina
Regional Sewer Authority,2 2 4 in which the plaintiff claimed she was

disabled, because she was required to take medication daily.225 The
Ferguson court found the EEOC guidelines state that simple diagnosis
is insufficient to establish disability; it is the effect on the individual's
major life activities that is dispositive.226 Simply using an aid does not
establish the disability. References to an aid have no bearing on determining a disability. The Ferguson decision properly recognizes the
EEOC's position and its interpretation of the Act.
A disability must substantially limit a major life activity, in order to
qualify under the first definition of disability. Obviously, a number of
decisions conflict with the analysis undertaken in Coghlan. These decisions bolster the EEOC's decision that measuring a limitation
should be without regard to mitigation or aids. Accordingly, mitigating measures serve no purpose in determination of a disability, and
should only enter into an analysis regarding the availability of a reasonable accommodation and whether the individual is otherwise
qualified.
CONCLUSION

Disabled individuals are an insular minority that has been subjected
to a history of discrimination. 22 7 The ADA and Rehabilitation Act
were enacted to protect and provide employment opportunities to
these individuals. The courts' focus and use of a post-mitigated measurement denies protection to many disabled persons. The courts and
the EEOC, by applying different standards, are producing inconsistent
220. See Roth, 57 F.3d at 1454.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. See id. See also Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2 (j) (1997).
224. 914 F. Supp. 1297 (D. S. C. 1996).
225. See id. at 1299.
226. See id. at 1298-99.
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
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rules for individuals seeking relief.22 8 The otherwise qualified language, which protects employers from unreasonableburdens, coupled
with the court's post-mitigation measurement produces a Scylla and
Charybdis dilemma.2 2 9 On one side sits the otherwise qualified requirement, poised to dash a disabled individual's discrimination claim.
On the other side, the post-mitigation measurement waits to capsize
those attempting to navigate Scylla. In order to prevail, the disabled
must carefully navigate this narrow stricture. However, the courts
have simply made it untenable for the disabled to do so. If the disabled are to reach the shores of equality, courts must widen this stricture by measuring without regard to mitigation. Otherwise, the courts
have created an unnavigable passage.
William Brent Shellhorse

228. This area has not remained static. Since the author's initial research, the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits have addressed this issue. See Doane v. City of Omaha,
115 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir.
1997).
In February 1997, the Eighth Circuit issued Doane. In this case, a police officer
sued the city claiming the city's refusal to rehire him was discrimination in violation of
the ADA. Doane, 115 F.3d at 625. The plaintiff, Royce Doane, lost his vision in one
eye due to glaucoma. See id. The city contended that Doane was not limited by his
loss of vision. See id. at 627. The city alleged that Doane's brain had compensated for
the loss of vision; therefore, he was not limited as required by the ADA. See id. The
court did not accept the employer's assertion and measured the plaintiff's disability
without regard to his adjustment. See id. The appellate court also refused to apply
the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Chandler and found the plaintiff disabled under the
ADA's definition. See id. at 628.
Later in the year, the Tenth Circuit addressed a claim by sisters, pilots for a regional
air carrier, who were denied employment by United Air Lines. See Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997). The defendant claimed the plaintiffs
were not covered by the ADA, because their condition, near-sightedness, was a relatively common and minor condition, and any substantial limiting impairment should
be measured post-mitigation. See id. at 896. The court chose to apply a pre-mitigation standard in evaluating the existence of a "physical or mental impairment." Id. at
899. However, the court adopted the post-mitigation standard in analyzing those limitations on a major life activity. See id. at 902. The court acknowledged the conflict
between the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance and the statutory language of the ADA.
See id. at 901. The court resolved the conflict in favor of United Air Lines, holding
that failure to meet a single requirement set by an employer does not qualify an individual as substantially limited in a major life activity. See id. at 905-06. This case
exemplifies the tension between interpretation of the regulations.
229. See ABRAHAM H. LASS ET AL., THE FACTs ON FILE DICTIONARY of CLASSICAL, BIBLICAL & LITERARY ALLUSIONS
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